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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the validity of injury statistics used to monitor 
workplace safety in the Canadian province of Alberta. These indicators were 
found to significantly under-report the rate of injury and to be vulnerable to 
gaming by both employers and the workers’ compensation board. These threats 
to the validity of the measures should limit the inferences drawn from the 
measures. Injury-based statistics were also found to be inadequate proxies for the 
broader construct of workplace safety. The political feasibility of alternative 
measures is also discussed. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, two measures of workplace injury derived from 
workers’ compensation claims data have become widely used in the Canadian 
province of Alberta. The lost-time claims (LTC) rate and the disabling injury (DI) 
rate are used to assess workplace safety efforts and communicate the risk of 
injury to the public. A key question among labour-side practitioners is whether 
these rates are accurate and valid measures of both workplace injury and safety. 
That is to say, are the inferences drawn about the real world from these 
indicators meaningful and correct? 
This study examined the validity of these injury measures. It concluded these 
indicators significantly understate the occurrence of injury. This is particularly 
problematic when these rates are used to communicate the incidence and risk of 
injury to the public. The study also raised questions about the degree that 
gaming by employers and, indeed, the workers’ compensation board (WCB) may 
undermine the validity of inferences subsequently drawn about injury rates. 
Finally, this study suggested injury-rate indicators do not effectively engage the 
real construct of interest—workplace safety. 
 
SAFETY STATISTICS IN ALBERTA 
 
The Government of Alberta adopted a business planning and reporting 
 system in the mid-1990s. Its stated purpose was to enhance
improve accountability (Speers
(2004) suggest its real purpose was to displace interest
a managerialist rationality in the pu
the public sector, introducing market
entrepreneurialism). This latter analysis is consistent with the then
notion of “reinventing government” (
Over time, questions have arisen about whether political pressure to tell good 
news stories has affected the validity (and perhaps reliability) of the measures. 
This dynamic may compound legitimate disputes about public
appropriate performance measures. 
injury each year to assess whether workplaces are fair, safe and healthy: the lost
time claim (LTC) rate and the disabling injury (DI) rate. Each statistic is created 
using claims data from th
Alberta measures labour programming (Barnetson 2008) by examining the 
validity of workplace safety measures
The LTC rate measures the number of times per 100 pers
that a work-related injury causes a worker to be away from work beyond the 
date of injury. The government notes that the LTC rate “represents the 
probability or risk of injury or disease to a worker during a one
period” (AEI 2010b: 6). That is to say, the LTC 
(assuming injuries are evenly distributed) of a worker incurring an injury that 
will result in a LTC. One calculates the LTC rate by dividing the annual number 
of LTCs by the person-years worked a
2009, for example, there were 28,688 LTCs and 1,730,000 person years worked, so 
the LTC rate was 1.66 lost
see note in Figure 1). Figure 1 shows Alberta’s LTC rate fr
trend line imposed.  
 
Alberta’s Lost
Source: WCB (2010a). Author’s calculations. 
slightly from the LTC reported by the government, although the trend and 
comparable. This reflects minor differences in data filtering and the time period of the 
calculations. 
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The DI rate measures the number of times per 100 person years worked that a 
work-related injury causes either a
duties. In this way, the DI rate incorporates all compensation claims where a 
worker was unable to do some
injury. The government asserts the DI 
disabling injury or disease to a worker during a period of one
2010b: 6). One calculates the DI rate by dividing the annual number of DIs by the 
person-years worked and multiplying by 100 (AEI 2009a). In 2009, for example, 
there were 53,313 DIs and 1,730,000 person years worked, so the DI rate was 3.08 
disabling injuries per 100 person years worked (WCB 2010a, see note in Figure 2). 
Figure 2 shows Alberta’s DI rate from 2002 to 2009 with a trend line imposed.
Alberta’s Disabling Injury Rate, 2002
Source: WCB (2010a). Author’s calculations. The DI calculated usin
slightly from the DI reported by the government, although the trend lines are 
comparable. This reflects minor differences in data filtering and the time period of the 
calculations. The DI rate prior to 2002 is unreliable and the DI rate 
should be used cautiously.
 
The LTC and DI rates have been used in provincial business plans and 
annual reports to assess the degree to which the government has achieved “
fair, safe and healthy work environment” (AEI 2009a
also used to communicate information about the risk of injury to the public. This 
press release is typical: 
 
April 28, 2010 
Provincial on-the-job injury rate hits record low
Annual workplace safety statistics also show decrease in fata
Edmonton [...] Fewer people were hurt on the job last year as Alberta’s workplace 
injury rate hit a record low. Occupational fatalities were also down, from 166 in 2008 
to 110 in 2009. “We’ve made good progress reducing workplace injuries but we can
still do better,” said Thomas Lukaszuk, Minister of Employment and Immigration. 
[…]  (AEI 2010a: 1). 
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The disabling injury claim rate decreased to 3.09 per 100 full-time jobs in 2009, 
from 3.63 per 100 in 2008. This included injured workers who could not work 
their next shift (lost time) or had to be placed on modified work to accommodate 
their injuries. 
Lost-time claim rates were down across all major industry sectors, with the 
manufacturing, processing and packaging, and the mining and petroleum 
development sectors experiencing the biggest drops. The provincial lost-time 
claim rate for 2009 was 1.69 per 100 full-time jobs, down almost 10 per cent from 
the previous year (AEI 2010a). 
Finally, firm-level LTC data was publically released beginning in late 2010 
(AEI 2010c; D’Aliesio 2010). According to the Minister, this public release is 
designed enhance employer compliance with occupational health and safety 
(OHS) legislation (De Guzman 2010).  
 
VALIDITY OF INJURY MEASURES 
 
A key question among labour-side practitioners is whether these injury rates 
are valid measures of both workplace injury and safety. That is to say, are the 
inferences drawn about the real world from these indicators meaningful and 
correct? A valid measure adequately operationalizes the concept it seeks to 
measure, such that inferences are meaningful (Sireci 1998). Examining a 
measure’s construct validity assesses the degree to which a construct’s 
operationalization accurately reflects the underlying construct it seeks to 
measure (Trochim and Donnelly 2006). This includes how well the measure(s) 
operationalized the underlying construct (i.e., content validity) by determining 
the degree to which the indicators measured all forms of workplace injury. This, 
in turn, requires establishing the purposes of the measures and how their 
operationalization limits the kinds of workplace injury that are visible. This 
information can then be combined with analysis of how the measures are used to 
assess whether the inferences drawn are meaningful.  
It is also useful to consider the concurrent and convergent validity of the 
measures to determine if the measures were “accurate” assessments of those 
aspects of workplace injury they purport to measure. More specifically, 
concurrent validity determines whether the measures can distinguish between 
behaviours they should, theoretically, be able to distinguish between. This 
includes assessing whether and to what degree gaming could shift injuries 
between and outside of these measures. And convergent validity determines 
how well outcomes match those of other measures that are theoretically related. 
For example, what relationships exist between the measures as well as between 
the measures and fatality and duration data? 
 
PURPOSE OF THE LTC AND DI RATES 
 
The LTC rate emerged in the wake of public consultations about workplace 
injuries. The Provincial Strategic Working Group on Workplace Safety (2002) 
recommended that the government seek to ensure “Alberta has a healthy and 
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injury-free workplace” (4). Short-term reductions in workplace injuries and 
illnesses were sought and measured by the LTC rate. This goal was adopted by 
the provincial government and given significant profile by the then-Minister of 
Human Resources and Employment, Clint Dunford.  
The DI rate was developed following a 2004 review (Provincial Strategic 
Working Group on Workplace Safety 2004). This measure was intended to 
mitigate the potential distortion of the LTC rate caused by employers 
increasingly assigning injured workers modified work duties to avoid an LTC 
(i.e., gaming the measure). The introduction of the DI rate was supposed to result 
in “a more accurate picture of the total number of illnesses and injuries” (AEI 
2010d: 3). This background suggests that these measures operationalize 
“workplace injury.” That construct is, in turn, used as a proxy for “workplace 
safety”.  
A definition of workplace injury might be a normally unexpected outcome of 
a workplace event that results in physical or mental damage to the structure or 
function of a worker’s body. The LTC and DI rates capture only a portion of such 
injuries. This may be problematic, depending upon what inferences are drawn 
from the rates. To determine whether the inferences drawn are valid, we need to 
have some sense of the degree and nature of the under-reporting they exhibit. 
 
UNDER-REPORTING AS A THREAT TO CONTENT VALIDITY 
 
A lost-time claim occurs when (1) a worker within the ambit of the workers’ 
compensation system is injured, (2) the injury is reported to and deemed 
compensable by the WCB, and (3) the injury causes a worker to be away from 
work beyond the date of injury. These criteria mean that LTCs comprise only a 
fraction of all workplace injuries. While under-reporting is a well-known aspect 
of claims-based injury statistics (Ison 1986; Cox and Lippel 2008), explicating the 
nature of the under-reporting is useful to assess its degree.  
The most obvious source of under-reporting is the exclusion of injuries to the 
10-20 percent of workers not covered by workers’ compensation. Assuming the 
rate of injury among workers with and without workers’ compensation coverage 
is comparable, this exclusion does not affect the LTC and DI rates. But this 
exclusion does significantly under-report the number of LTCs and DIs that occur. 
This is important because it affects the percentage of injuries visible when 
injuries are defined as LTCs and DIs. 
Injuries not recognized as compensable are also excluded, including some 
rejected claims as well as accepted claims that did not trigger a lost-time claim. 
The exclusion of non-LTC injuries is somewhat mitigated by the presence of the 
DI rate (which captures injuries that required modified work). But both the LTC 
and DI measures ignore injuries that did not affect workplace attendance. Claims 
that required “medical-aid only” or those with no cost (to the WCB) are 
excluded. Further, minor injuries (e.g., burns, cuts, sprains and strains that do 
not require medical attention or more than the rest of the shift off) for which 
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reporting is not required and psychological injuries (which is largely excluded 
from the ambit of workers’ compensation in Alberta) are excluded.  
Potentially compensable injuries not reported to a WCB are also excluded. 
Shannon and Lowe (2002) suggest approximately 40 percent of compensable 
injuries in Canada are unreported. The reasons for non-reporting vary. Smith, 
Kosny and Mustard (2009) suggest the availability of other forms of 
compensation may be an important factor. Occupational diseases are also subject 
to significant under-reporting, perhaps because their long latency periods and 
murky causality make it difficult to recognize occupational origins (Kraut 1994, 
2009). Recent assessments of under-reporting include studies of mesothelioma 
(Payne and Pichora 2009; Cree et al. 2009) and asthma (Cherry et al. 2009). It is 
difficult to estimate the magnitude of this effect, but consider the example of 
occupational cancer.  
In 2005, approximately 13,100 Albertans were diagnosed as having cancer 
and 5,500 Albertans died from cancer (Canadian Cancer Society/National Cancer 
Institute 2005). The then-Alberta Cancer Board conservatively estimated that 8 
percent of all cancers have an occupational link (Alberta Cancer Foundation 
2005). This suggests just over 1,000 of Alberta’s 2005 reported cancers and cancer 
deaths were occupational cancers and about 440 deaths were occupationally 
related. Yet, the Alberta WCB accepted only 29 claims for cancer (2.9 percent) 
and reported just 38 cancer-related fatalities (8.6 percent) that year (WCB 2005). 
Considering occupational cancer alone could have increased the 2005 LTC rate 
by as much as 2.5 percent and the occupational fatality rate by an astounding 276 
percent. 
Gender discrimination may also impact under-reporting. Work arrangements 
and injuries more common to women than men result in the under-reporting or 
under-acceptance of injury (Cox and Lippel 2008; Quinlain, Mayhew and Bohle 
2001; Lippel 2006; Azarhoff et al. 2004). Storey’s (2009) analysis of Ontario 
suggests systemic discrimination against claims filed by women. Lippel (1999, 
2004) also reports gender differences in Quebec’s compensation system 
regarding stress-related and musculo-skeletal injuries. There is no reliable way to 
estimate the effect discrimination has on claims data. Further, Smith et al. (2009) 
note that gender is not the only worker characteristic associated with reduced 
access to compensation benefits. 
 
DEGREE OF UNDERSTATEMENT OF INJURY  
 
An example illustrates the degree these measures distort our perception of 
workplace injury levels. In 2009, Alberta reported 28,688 lost-time claims. To this 
must be added approximately 24,625 more claims for injuries requiring modified 
work. A further 95,854 claims for medical aid-only injuries should also be added. 
Ignoring the approximately 16,000 claims denied for various reasons (e.g., 
insufficient information, worker not covered by compensation, or injury not 
compensable), this totals some 149,167 accepted claims (WCB, 2010a).  
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There is no way to accurately estimate the number of minor injuries (which 
did not trigger a workers’ compensation claim), psychological injuries (which are 
broadly excluded from compensation), unreported occupational diseases or the 
effects of gender discrimination. It is possible to correct for the 13 percent of the 
workforce not covered by workers’ compensation (WCB 2010a). Assuming a 
similar rate of injury among covered and uncovered workers, total injuries 
increase to around 171,456 (149,167/87x100). Accounting for the 40 percent of 
compensable injuries that are not reported at all brings the number of workplace 
injuries to approximately 285,760 (171,456/60x100).  
What this example shows is that the largest number of workplace “injuries” 
visible in claims statistics (149,167) still only reveals about half of the total 
injuries (285,760) that required at least some medical aid. Further, even the 
“corrected” number of 285,760 effectively ignores occupational disease and 
psychological injuries as well as minor injuries where no treatment beyond first 
aid was required. These injuries include strains, contusions, lacerations and 
burns of a degree that varies based upon the worker’s ability to tolerate the 
injury without seeking medical treatment. Discussion among practitioners 
suggests accounting for disease and minor injuries would push the number close 
to 500,000 injuries per year but, for the purpose of this analysis, this estimate will 
be ignored. Consequently, this analysis suggests defining workplace injuries as 
LTCs under-reports workplace injury by a factor of at least 10. And defining 
them as DIs under-reports injuries by a factor of at least 5.4.  
 
IMPACT OF UNDER-REPORTING ON VALIDITY 
 
Under-reporting by the LTC and DI rates suggests these measures do not 
fully engage the construct of workplace injury. Rather, they operationalize 
workplace injuries by counting serious injuries that affect job performance. It is 
not fully clear why such narrow measures were chosen. Foster (2010) indicates 
the government chose the LTC because of its availability and reliability. Push 
back from the Provincial Strategic Working Group on Workplace Safety (2004) 
later led to the adoption of the DI rate. One result of the measures’ narrow focus 
is that it limits the government’s ability to meaningfully generalize from the 
measures.  
For example, to say to the public that the LTC and DI rates indicate “[f]ewer 
people were hurt on the job last year as Alberta’s workplace injury rate hit a 
record low” (AIE 2010a: 1) overstates the inferences these measures support. The 
LTC and DI rate have declined. But this does not mean the overall number or 
rate of workplace injury has declined to the same degree or even at all. At best, it 
demonstrates the rate of serious injuries resulting in accepted workers’ 
compensation claims has declined (although see the discussion below regarding 
the source of this decline).  
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Similarly, consider how injury rates are discussed: 
  
The disabling injury claim rate decreased to 3.09 per 100 full-time jobs in 2009, from 
3.63 per 100 in 2008. This includes injured workers who cannot work their next shift 
(lost time) or have to be placed on modified work to accommodate their injuries. 
Lost-time claim rates were down across all major industry sectors, with the 
manufacturing, processing and packaging, and the mining and petroleum 
development sectors experiencing the biggest drops. The provincial lost-time claim 
rate for 2009 was 1.69 per 100 full-time jobs, down almost 10 per cent from the 
previous year (AEI 2010a: 1). 
 
The target of this information is the public (via the media), which has a non-
expert understanding of injury measures. The discussion of injury rates, put 
colloquially, suggests the probability of a worker experiencing a DI is about 3 
percent. It is improbable that the public will understand that the DI rate 
considers only about 33 percent of workplace injuries that require at least 
medical attention and that DIs comprise some significantly smaller subset of all 
workplace injuries that workers might find objectionable. The incorrect 
conclusions that workers will likely draw about the risks they face in the 
workplace suggests the inferences drawn from the LTC and DI measures, when 
they are used as tools of public communication, are not valid. Further, these 
incorrect assumptions may negatively affect practical or political action by 
workers to make workplaces safer. 
Similarly, assertions about the rigor of Alberta’s measures can also be 
overstated: 
 
[…] Alberta’s system for gathering and reporting workplace injury data is one of the 
most stringent in the country. Different provinces have different measuring sticks for 
injury reporting—some require certain days off from work for an injury to be 
statistically counted as an “accident”, while Alberta counts every single injury, 
regardless of severity or lost time from work, as an accident, (Minister) Lukaszuk 
explained (De Guzman 2010: 1). 
 
While Alberta’s counting system may be stringent (i.e., reliable), it is not 
necessarily accurate (i.e., valid). Alberta does not count “every single injury, 
regardless of severity or lost time from work, as an accident” (emphasis mine). 
Rather, it counts only those injuries that require time lost from work or modified 
work.  
That said, the LTC and DI rates report many of the most serious workplace 
injuries. This may provide useful information to policy makers about the risk or 
incidence of very serious injury. Fatalities are the most serious forms of 
workplace injury and the downward trends in the LTC (Figure 1) and DI (Figure 
2) rates broadly mirror the downward trend in Alberta’s fatality rate (Figure 3), 
although the LTC and DI rates have declined much more quickly. This raises the 
question of what we can safely infer about workplace injuries or safety from 
declines in the LTC and DI rates.  
9   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society
 
Alberta Fatalities per Million 
Source: AEI (2010b). Excludes fatalities under the federal jurisdiction.
 
DECLINING LOST-TIME CLAIM RATES
 
Figure 1 shows changes in the LTC rate over time, indicating a decline. It is 
unclear whether declining LTCs reflect declining rates of injury or some other 
factor. No obvious linkage between economic indicators and injury rates exis
although more careful research may tease some out. There was a significant 
increase in employment levels from 2002 to 2009, with a sharp and large 
reduction in employment in 2009 as a result of the recession (AHS 2012). The 
Alberta Federation of Labour
disproportionately affected resource extraction industries and thus affected 
injury rates, but this assertion requires better evidence than the AFL presents. 
During the entirety of this period, there was a significant inc
workers, and a shift from domestic migrants to temporary foreign workers 
(Alberta 2011a). It is unclear how this change affected injury rates, 
al. (2011) suggest that migrant workers frequently do not report injuries in a
timely manner. Due to changes in government data calculations, it is not possible
to track industry-level injury rates over time (Alberta 2011b).
An important criticism of claims
vulnerable to gaming activity by em
compensation premium rebates gives employers an incentive to aggressively 
manage injury claims to reduce claim costs. Rebates are available to most 
Canadian employers under experience
can access premium discounts of up to 40
percent under the Partnership in Injury Reduction (PIR) program 
Research suggests employers often pursue rebate incentives via aggressive 
claims management rather than by improving workplace safety (Lanoie 1992; 
Kralj 1994, 1995; Hyatt and Krajl 1995; MacEachen 2001; Thomason and 
Pozzebon 2002). In 2010, the WCB repor
million in premiums in the PIR system (WCB 2011)
Auditor General (2010) found that half of employers who persistently fail to 
comply with health and safety orders continued to receive PIR rebat
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 Employer claims management can include legitimate activities, such as 
offering injured workers appropriate modified duties or filing legitimate appeals 
of claims. It can also include illegitimate activities, such as hiding accidents and 
pressuring workers to not file claims, providing inappropriate modified work or 
failing to provide promised modified work, contracting out hazardous work, and 
filing spurious appeals of claims. Such activities undermine the concurrent 
validity of the LTC and DI rates be
distinguish types of (or even identify) injuries.
It is generally accepted that gaming (legitimate and/or illegitimate) does 
occur in Alberta. In fact, the introduction of the DI rate was a response to 
distortions caused by employer gaming to reduce claim costs (
Strategic Working Group on Workplace Safety 2004; Foster 2010). There is some 
evidence to support this assumption, although it is not conclusive.
combines the LTC and DI rates for comparat
and DI rates from 2002 to 2007 with a trend line.
 
Source: WCB (2010a). Author’s DI calculations.
 
Alberta’s LTC and DI Rates with Trendlines, 2002
Source: WCB (2010a). Author’s DI calculations.
 
Figure 5 shows decreases in the LTC rate from 2002 to 2007 being offset by 
increases in the DI rate. There are two main explanations for this trend: declining 
severity or gaming. It may be that there were few
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therefore caused a shift in claim type from lost-time to disabling injury. Claim 
duration provides equivocal support for this conclusion. The average duration of 
an LTC declined from 50.9 days in 2003 to 33.4 days in 2007 (WCB 2008). This 
may reflect declining severity or that employers are reducing lost-time claim 
duration (e.g., by offering employees modified work sooner) rather than actually 
reducing the incidence of serious injuries. Reduced duration may also reflect 
increased WCB attention to speeding up the processing and closing of claims. 
Fatality data does not support the reduction in severity hypothesis: the 2002 to 
2007 fatality rate (not shown) has a flat trend-line (AEI 2009b). 
Alternately, the substitution effect may indicate legitimate or illegitimate 
claims management behaviour by employers in pursuit of Alberta’s premium 
rebate systems (i.e., “converting” LTCs into DIs). If this gaming is illegitimate, it 
can negatively affect injured workers (MacEachen et al. 2007). It is, however, also 
possible that both declining severity and gaming are at work simultaneously. Of 
the two explanations (declining severity or gaming), legitimate and/or 
illegitimate gaming seems more consistent with the observer, fatality and 
duration evidence. If gaming has made an important contribution to the decline 
in the LTC rate, this suggests the LTC rate may overstate the degree to which 
workplaces became safer between 2002 and 2007. 
 
DECLINING DISABLING INJURY RATE 
 
Practitioners generally accept that the downward trend in the DI rate (see 
Figure 4) that began in 2007 suggests the overall rate of serious workplace injury 
(where a worker cannot do his or her normal job the next day) has declined. This 
reflects the belief that it is much more difficult to game the DI rate than the LTC 
because gaming the DI rate requires forcing an injured worker to continue to 
perform work while injured or not report injuries at all. Yet some practitioners 
privately suggest gaming the DI rate is possible and, as the return on LTC to DI 
conversions diminishes (because easily converted LTCs have already been 
converted), the economic incentive to converting DIs to no- or low-cost claims 
increases. 
For example, one employer-side OHS staffer also suggests that the PIR 
program requires employers in some industries to present WCB claim records 
and a valid Certificate of Recognition (COR) to receive or maintain contracts. 
Reporting serious injuries can trigger suspensions of the COR which, in turn, will 
limit employers’ ability to bid on contracts.  
 
[…] Now they are faced with… employees potentially not working in a market where 
skilled help is very difficult to maintain. So what happens with MOST business at this 
point or even before it—is they will cheat.  
Big companies are notorious for it. They will maintain their own medical staff, 
pay for air ambulance privately, have employees sitting in an office essentially doing 
nothing so time loss is either hidden completely or vastly minimized though no 
meaningful work was ever performed. I have worked for midsized employers in the 
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past who had a practice of discouraging staff from any WCB paperwork and they 
would pay them to sit at home and recover in exchange.  
This is far more common than one would like to think but it’s because the systems 
implemented ostensibly to improve safety have not achieved a safer work 
environment but has created penalization if you do not have huge dollars to put into 
disability "management" which in truth is all too often just subterfuge at the ongoing 
expense of the worker. In the mean time, the real issues with workplace safety 
continue to languish because they are not effectively addressed by these programs 
and are a distraction to the employer in regards to what is actually important (Labour 
& Employment in Alberta 2011: 1). 
 
Anecdotal evidence has its perils, but voluntary disclosures against one’s 
interest tend to ring true. Further, employers can make an injured worker do 
tasks the worker “cannot” do because injured workers have some discretion in 
how much pain they are prepared to put up with before seeking accommodation 
of their discomfort through modified work. The exercise of this discretion may 
be responsive to incentives (or threats) from supervisors and other workers.  
Evidence to support the suggestion of gaming is difficult to find. But consider 
Figure 6, which presents the number DI claims accepted, rejected and processed. 
Processed claims are those that entailed little to no wage-loss (i.e., the only costs 
were medical aid costs) thus the WCB did not have to adjudicate and “accept” 
them (WCB 2010a). These might be claims where the injury prevented the 
worker from doing the workers’ job the next day but the employer imposed no 
wage-loss and, thus, the cost of the claim was confined to medical aid costs. Note 
the percentage of DI claims processed each year.  
 
Figure 6 
Disabling Injury Claims by Acceptance Decision 
Decision 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Accepted 51917 53843 56488 61264 57538 48222 46985 38317 
Denied 1938 2448 3220 3772 3468 3668 3977 3676 
Investigation 1 0 0 0 1 9 41 125 
Not Yet 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Processed 
2848 
(5.2%) 
3015 
(5.3%) 
2840 
(4.8%) 
3066 
(4.7%) 
12893 
(18.3%) 
19737 
(29%) 
19539 
(29.4%) 
14996 
(28.1%) 
Total 56704 59308 62548 68102 73900 71636 70542 57122 
Source: WCB (2010a).  
 
 Note that the DI rate is calculated based on accepted + processed claims. 
Also note that the sharp decline in DIs in 2009 may be the result of dramatic 
reduction in employment in construction, oil-and-gas, and manufacturing, 
Alberta’s three most dangerous occupations (AFL 2010). 
The number of “accepted” DI claims began a downward trend in 2005. By 
contrast, the number of “processed” claims quadrupled between 2005 and 2006 
and grew again by 50 percent the next year. A similar, although less dramatic, 
shift occurred in the categorization of “medical-aid only” claims (not shown) 
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during this time period. There are three explanations that, individually or 
collectively, account for this shift.
It may be that, as the province prepared to release the disabling injur
2006, the WCB began more carefully classifying disabling injury claims. In this 
case, the increase in processed claims is an artifact of inconsistent coding over 
time. Alternately, employers may have begun reducing the number of DIs for 
which they claimed wage
qualify for premium rebates. Or it may be that there has been a decline in the 
severity of disabling injuries over time thus triggering fewer instances of 
modified work where the employer
combination of factors may be responsible. 
It is not clear which explanation is correct. The point, though, is that this sort 
of analysis is absent from most discussions of the DI rate. What this data 
suggests is that (1) there appear to be important changes occurring within the DI 
rate and (2) one explanation is employer gaming, which may undermine the 
conclusion that declining DI rates means workplaces are safer. That there are 
difficult-to-see changes occurring within
drawn suggested examining whether there were changes in the claims 
acceptance rate that might further confound assertions about what we can 
conclude from changes in the LTC and DI rates
 
THE IMPACT OF RISING
 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of Alberta LTCs rejected by the WCB from 
1996 to 2009. Between 1996 and 2001, the annual rejection rate averaged 3.98
percent. After 2001, there is a distinct upwards trend in the rate of LTC rejections. 
Medical-aid only claim rejection rates also increased after 2001, rising from 5
percent in 2001 to 9.7 percent
more difficult to calculate due to data limitations, but show a general trend 
upwards from 3.4 percent
Percentage of Alberta Lost
Source: WCB (2010a). 
 
The post-2001 increase in the LTC rejection rate coincided with a 
government-sponsored effort to reduce workplace 
LTC) by 40 percent by 2004 (Provincial Strategic Working Group on Workplace 
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 REJECTION RATES 
 in 2009. Disabling injury claim rejections rates are 
 in 2002 to 6.4 percent in 2009 (WCB 2010a). 
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Safety 2002). There is no evidence of major changes in the nature of workplace 
injuries between 2001 and 2002. Consequently, this suggests that the WCB may 
have begun applying additional rigor post-2001 when determining whether 
claims are compensable. An alternate (or complementary) explanation is that 
employers may have begun supplying additional information and/or applying 
pressure to WCB adjudicators. Some practitioners privately opine that the WCB 
or its employees may be engaging in gaming behaviour in pursuit of political or 
financial rewards respectively.  
This possibility is largely ignored by the literature and makes for an 
interesting discussion. All WCB employees may face implicit pressure to 
minimize claim acceptance rates or benefit duration in order to minimize 
employer premiums. Alberta’s WCB also has a bonus system that presently 
rewards employees for (among other things) ensuring no more than 862 claims 
exist with disability payments lasting longer than three months (Cryderman 
2010a; WCB 2010b). The bonuses handed out for meeting such goals are 
significant, comprising up to 8 percent of employee salaries (an average of 
$5,600) and costing $8 million in 2009 (Cryderman 2010b).  
The possibility of WCB gaming claims is typically dismissed based on the 
assertion that claim decisions are driven by medical evidence and thus there is 
no opportunity for gaming (e.g., Cryderman 2010b). This overstates the 
objectivity of medical diagnoses and recommendations (McKinlay, Potter and 
Fledman 1996; Tracy et al. 2005; Hajjaj et al. 2010). It also ignores that WCB 
adjudicators have discretion, for example, in determining whether an injury is 
compensable. In determining compensability, some forms of injury are subjected 
to more stringent scrutiny and different standards of proof, such as psychological 
injuries and occupational diseases (Barnetson 2010). And adjudicators can also 
simply make an improper or incorrect decision. In 2009, for example, Alberta’s 
independent WCB appeals commission overturned 25.5 percent of nearly 1900 
decisions referred to it—a typical year (WCB 2010c). 
Whether WCB claims adjudicators use legitimate or illegitimate means in 
order to achieve this benchmark is difficult to assess.1 The benchmark itself 
reflects WCBs (as organizations) may find political advantage in minimizing 
claim costs that, in turn, reduce employer premiums (Alberta has the lowest in 
the country). WCBs may also find political value in generating data that suggests 
injury rates are declining, particularly if the WCB is responsible for occupational 
health and safety in the jurisdiction (which is not the case in Alberta). While it is 
not clear whether increased rejection rates post-2001 were appropriate or 
inappropriate, the net effect of a rising rejection rates is to exaggerate the 
reduction in the LTC and DI rates. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Alberta’s LTC and DI rates are narrow measures of workplace injury. The 
claims data underlying these measures create two important threats to their 
validity. First, unreported injuries and diseases mean the LTC and DI rate under-
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estimate the true rate of serious injury. Second, there is some question about 
whether employer and WCB gaming—an effect that may vary over time—may 
account for some of the changes seen in the rates. These threats to the concurrent 
and convergent validity suggest inferences that changes in workplace injury 
statistics should be treated with caution. 
The content validity of the measures—how well the measures engage the 
broader construct of workplace injury—is also questionable, given the uses that 
the measures are put to by the government. As an indicator of whether Alberta 
has fair, safe and healthy workplaces, both the LTC and DI rates provide a very 
partial picture. Their focus on the most serious forms of injury ignores (and 
indeed obscures) other forms of injury that might also be of concern to Albertans. 
Consequently, these measures under-report the risk of workplace injury. 
This under-reporting can be recognized via careful consideration of the 
definitions that accompany these indicators. But members of the public are 
unlikely possess or develop the definitional knowledge about the categories of 
workers’ compensation claims and other sources of under-reporting. Further, 
they would have little reason to do so, given the government’s “good news” 
communication efforts around workplace injury. For example, in a January 2012 
radio interview, I criticized the government’s claim that 20 successful OHS 
prosecutions in 2011 was a good news story (AHS 2011a), given both the 
reported and actual levels of serious injury in Alberta (CBC 2012a). The next day, 
government spokesperson Barry Harrison responded that the injury numbers I 
used in my interview were not quantifiable (CBC 2012b). That the government 
does not provide accurate workplace injury statistics appears lost on Harrison. 
Further, his assertion that the government went after “the big fish” (where there 
was a serious injury and a reasonable likelihood of prosecution) is difficult to 
view as anything but spin: of the 50,000 disabling injuries that occur each year, 
only 20 meet these criteria?  
Overall, this analysis suggests that the content validity of these indicators is 
too limited to sustain the inferences drawn (and likely to be drawn) from them 
about the risk of workplace injury. Criticism of the LTC and DI rates are often 
met with the response that no better injury indicators are available. This misses 
the point that using the construct of workplace injury as the sole proxy for the 
construct of workplace safety is inappropriate. The government’s espoused goal 
is to protect workers from workplace injuries by developing a safe work 
environment. Injury measures assess an important outcome, but tell us little 
about the safety of workplaces. Focusing measurement on the indicators of 
workplace safety would result in more valid measures.  
For example, the government recently released the results of several safety 
inspection blitzes in residential construction (AHS 2011b), commercial 
construction (AEI 2010e), workplaces that operate forklifts (AEI 2011a) and 
workplaces the employ younger workers (AEI, 2011b). This inspection data 
showed widespread non-compliance with safety rules (even after employers 
were apprised the inspections would occur) but does not show changes over 
time. Time-series administrative data on employer safety records from random 
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inspections (based on assumptions that compliance with standards is a good 
proxy for safety and inspections are accurate) is readily available in government 
databases. The government already provides similar restaurant inspection 
reports for public consumption.  
In the wake of the 2010 Auditor General’s report on OHS, the government 
decided to release employer safety data (eight years after they promised to), but 
in the form of LTC information (D’Aliesio 2010). This is problematic in several 
ways. The volume of data (Alberta has approximately 140,000 employers with 
WCB accounts) and the ability of workers to identify their employer (many of 
which will be numbered companies or similarly named companies in large 
corporate families) will hamper identification of employers (AFL 2010). Further 
the use of LTC data under-reports the incidence of injury by a factor of 10. The 
government has indicated it will not release a shorter list of employers with long-
term claims rates in excess of industry norms or the results of OHS inspections. 
It is unclear why the government would not release the more accurate 
inspection data. One explanation is that such data might generate the kind of 
political difficulties that Speers (2004) suggests foreclose their usage. For 
example, this data might draw attention to the relatively small number of annual 
inspections completed. At present rates, it would take approximately 14 years to 
inspect each Alberta workplace once (Barnetson 2010). This, in turn, might raise 
politically difficult questions about the adequacy of resources allocated to worker 
safety. It might also reveal information about the time lag between safety 
complaints and inspection (up to 18 days) as well as between an order being 
issued and compliance (an average of 86 days) (Auditor General 2010). Further, 
the overall level of (non)compliance might provide disturbing data about the 
degree of compliance among employers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The lost-time claims and the disabling injury rates provide useful 
information about workers’ compensation claims for serious workplace injuries. 
When used as broader measures of workplace injury, two concerns arise. First, 
the narrow scope of the measures under-reports the true level of workplace 
injury, although the nature and degree of under-reporting may not be evident to 
the audiences to whom this information is reported. This limited engagement 
with the construct of workplace injury suggests inferences drawn from the 
measures about workplace injury may be misleading and invalid.  
Second, the data upon which these measures are based may be subject to 
gaming by employers and the WCB. Such gaming confounds our ability to draw 
meaningful inferences about even general trends in the incidence or severity of 
workplace injuries. Measuring the presence and degree of gaming that occurs 
poses significant methodological challenges, but represents the most important 
future direction for research stemming from their study.  
This study indicates that injury data is also not an adequate proxy by which 
to measure whether workplaces are fair, safe and healthy. The under-reporting of 
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occupational disease and exclusion of psychological injuries from compensation 
precludes drawing any meaningful conclusions about how healthy workplaces 
are. And inferences about safety are limited to only the most serious worker 
injuries, which also trigger a claim. There is little focus on working conditions, or 
indeed, the behaviour of employers.  
Alternative measures of workplace safety are available, but they may be 
politically unpalatable. This raises the question, alluded to by Townley et al. 
(2004) about whether these indicators serve political purposes. For example, 
under-reporting the incidence and risk of injury can reduce the motivation and 
political leverage of workers taking workplace safety precautions and/or 
advocating more stringent (or even maintaining existing) health and safety 
standards. It can also reduce the threat workplace injury poses to social stability. 
These considerations go beyond the scope of this article but represent interesting 
lines of further inquiry. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Athabasca University’s Research Incentive Grants program funded data 
collection. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Jason 
Foster for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
NOTES 
                                               
1  The author attempted to access Alberta WCB policy documents to search for 
evidence bearing upon this question. An initial freedom of information request 
resulted in a quote of $236,000 for production of the materials (apparently a record 
cost estimate!). A narrowing of the request reduced the cost to approximately $4000. 
Of the several hundred pages of material produced by the WCB in response to the 
narrowed request, 75 percent was redacted thereby rendering this data collection 
approach ineffective and thus the inner workings of the WCB opaque. Subsequent 
efforts to engage current and former WCB employees in discussion about this system 
or WCB adjudication in general has been unsuccessful. Typically potential 
informants indicated they feared sanction by the WCB if they spoke, even off of the 
record. 
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